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Abstract
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article examines the differences in labour legislation between the US and Canada, which may help to
explain these diverging experiences, primarily: the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) section 7
protection for concerted activity, and the NLRA section 502 ability for a good faith strike due to
abnormally dangerous conditions for work. This article outlines and compares the situation of, and
consequences for, three categories of workers engaging in a strike over fears of workplace safety:
unionized employees, non-unionized employees, and non-employees, such as independent contractors
under the NLRA compared to under the Ontario Labour Relations Act (OLRA), as generally representative
of Canadian labour legislation. In the final section, this article considers how a statutory provision similar
to the NLRA protected concerted activity provision might be incorporated into Canadian labour legislation
such as the OLRA. It also considers some more fundamental questions that such changes might prompt
policymakers to reconsider, including: the focus of our statutory system on “organizing” collective action
to the exclusion of “mobilizing” collective action, and questions about the potential role of minority
unionism in our labour legislation system.
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WORKERS AROUND THE GLOBE have been engaging in a startling wave of
strikes, protests, and other collective action over concerns about unsafe working
conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic. Many of these actions have taken
place in the United States, across a wide array of sectors and occupations, including
retail, grocery, delivery, fast food, food processing, manufacturing, postal, transit,
and health care.1 Many of these collective worker actions involve some of the
largest and most powerful corporate international employers, such as Amazon,
McDonald’s, and Whole Foods, as well as smaller enterprises. Remarkably,
many of these actions have taken place in the private sector by non-unionized
1.

See e.g. Steven Greenhouse, “Is Your Grocery Delivery Worth a Worker’s Life?,” Te New York
Times (30 March 2020), online: <nytimes.com/2020/03/30/opinion/coronavirus-workerstrike.html> [perma.cc/672Q-FL2F] (providing an overview of US worker safety strikes);
Bridget Read, “Every Food and Delivery Strike Happening Over Coronavirus” (27
May 2020), online: <thecut.com/2020/05/whole-foods-amazon-mcdonalds-amongcoronavirus-strikes.html> [perma.cc/L5ZC-3DF5]; Christopher Weber, “Work safety
strike, virus lockdown protest set for May Day,” CTV News (1 May 2020), online:
<ctvnews.ca/world/work-safety-strike-virus-lockdown-protest-set-for-may-day-1.4920157>
[perma.cc/J4TH-PK5J].
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workers. Perhaps most surprising of all is that some of these eforts have been
efective, leading to improved working conditions for these workers, at least
for the moment.2
Te events in the US were widely reported in Canada, involving as they did
many prominent companies that also operate with many employees in many
locations in this country. Tis prompted several journalists to ask whether similar
strikes and actions were planned at these companies’ Canadian workplaces and
why their Canadian employees weren’t also engaging in such strikes.3 As a recent
media article asks: “U.S. Workers are Organizing Mass Strikes. Why Aren’t
Canadian Workers?”4
Tis article addresses this question. In particular, it considers whether
diferences in labour legislation between the two countries help to explain why
non-unionized employees in the US but not in Canada have been engaging in
these strikes, and the relatively subdued actions of even unionized employees
in this country. It frst examines and compares worker actions during the
pandemic in the US and in Canada. Next, it examines the relevant provisions
of the US National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) underlying these non-union
strikes, focusing on that Act’s protected concerted activity provision, which is
not found in Canadian labour statutes.5 To highlight the diferences between
the US and Canadian legal contexts, it outlines and compares the situation
of, and consequences for, three categories of workers engaging in a strike over
2.

3.

4.
5.

See e.g. Shirin Ghafary, “Te May Day strike from Amazon, Instacart, and Target workers
didn’t stop business. It was still a success” (1 May 2020), online: <vox.com/recode/2020/
5/1/21244151/may-day-strike-amazon-instacart-target-success-turnout-fedex-protestessential-workers-chris-smalls> [perma.cc/ZKN9-4NRX]; Hannah Jackson & Maryam Shah,
“Instacart announces coronavirus protections amid threats of a strike,” Global News (29
March 2020), online: <globalnews.ca/news/6748137/coroanvirus-instacart-strike> [perma.
cc/H7VL-GHRL]; Greenhouse, supra note 1; Kate Taylor, “Te workers that make your food
put their lives on the line during pandemic. Whether they’re protected now is up to you,”
Business Insider (25 May 2020), online: <businessinsider.com/workers-new-benefts-in-thepandemic-will-they-keep-them-2020-5> [perma.cc/6VGK-MRLT].
See e.g. Zaid Noorsumar, “U.S. workers are organizing mass strikes. Why aren’t Canadian
workers?” Vice (13 May 2020), online: <vice.com/en_ca/article/88998z/amazon-workers-areorganizing-strikes-in-the-us-why-arent-canadian-workers> [perma.cc/U4QP-KD9E]; Te
Associated Press, “U.S. Amazon and Instacart workers strike to protest COVID-19 hazards
on the job,” CBC News (31 March 2020), online: <cbc.ca/news/business/amazon-instacardcoronavirus-1.5515868> [perma.cc/2H78-VGTH] (reporting that, when asked, organizers
of planned US-wide Whole Foods employee strike said they were “unaware of any plans for
similar actions in Canada”).
Noorsumar, supra note 3.
National Labor Relations Act, 29 USC ss 151-69 (1935) at §157 [NLRA].
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fears of workplace safety: unionized employees, non-unionized employees, and
non-employees, such as independent contractors under the NLRA compared to
under the Ontario Labour Relations Act (OLRA), as generally representative of
Canadian labour legislation.6 In the fnal section, this article considers how a
statutory provision similar to the NLRA protected concerted activity provision
might be incorporated into Canadian labour legislation, such as the OLRA. It also
considers some uncomfortable questions that may need to be addressed about the
nature and scope of our labour relations systems. Tese include questions about
the fundamental type of collective action recognized by our labour relations
system, and questions about a potential role for minority unionism. Tis article
focuses on statutory labour law and does not address treatment of employees’
refusal to work pursuant to occupational health and safety legislation.7

I. NON-UNIONIZED EMPLOYEE STRIKES IN THE UNITED
STATES
As noted in the introduction, non-unionized employees across many companies,
industries, and occupations in the US have taken part in strikes and other forms
of collective action during the pandemic out of fear of unsafe workplaces. In many
cases, these were also accompanied by complaints of retaliation against those
workers leading or participating in these activities. One of the most prominent
examples, involving Amazon, is briefy described below, to ofer a sense of what
has been occurring and as a basis for comparison with events in Canada at the
workplaces of this same company and others.
Amazon workers at many locations in the US have engaged in demonstrations
and walk-out strikes, demanding better working conditions, such as protective
equipment, improved sick leave, and sanitizing of facilities. A widely publicized
example involved an Amazon worker, Chris Smalls, fred hours after organizing
a strike at an Amazon warehouse on Staten Island to protest the lack of
safety protection for employees. Amazon contends that he was terminated
for misconduct; Smalls says it was retaliation.8 Amazon employee actions in
Chicago have also garnered attention. Tere, workers have engaged in petitions,
walk-out strikes, and work slowdowns to protest their pandemic working
6.
7.
8.

Labour Relations Act, 1995, SO 1995, c 1, Sched A [OLRA].
See e.g. Occupational Health and Safety Act, RSO 1990, c O.1 [OHSA].
Sarah Jones, “Workers are trying to prevent a deadly COVID-19 disaster,” New York
Magazine (9 April 2020), online: <nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/04/protesting-workers-aretrying-to-save-lives.html> [perma.cc/7PGG-DFXK].
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conditions.9 Employee leaders were terminated in what DCH1 Amazonians
United, a non-union worker group, claims was targeted retaliation against these
employees. Tis group has since fled multiple complaints with the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB), claiming interference with these employees’
right to engage in protected concerted activity.10
Similar episodes of non-unionized employee strikes seeking safe work
conditions—both at individual workplaces as well as nation-wide, and involving
multiple workplaces and companies—have been taking place during the
pandemic at McDonald’s, Whole Foods, and many other workplaces. As with
Amazon, some of these episodes have also resulted in employment repercussions
for the employees involved.11
Important to the discussion in this article, and our comparison with the
Canadian situation, is that in many of these cases, including the Amazon
example, employees, or organizations on their behalf, have brought unfair labour
practice (ULP) complaints against their employers, pursuant to section 8(a)(1)
of the NLRA to protect striking employees from negative consequences for these
actions. Tese ULPs claim that the employer “interfere[d] with, restrain[ed],
or coerce[d] employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 [of
the NLRA].”12 Section 7 guarantees employees the right to engage in “protected
concerted activity” for “mutual aid or protection,” stating that:
9.

Amazonians United, “How Amazon Workers are Organizing for the Long Haul” (11 May
2020), online: <www.labornotes.org/2020/05/how-amazon-workers-are-organizing-longhaul> [perma.cc/G6LN-YH5H]; Caroline O’Donovan, “Te NLRB is Looking into Claims
that Amazon Violated Employees’ Rights During the Coronavirus Pandemic” (18 April
2020), online: <www.buzzfeednews.com/article/carolineodonovan/federal-labor-regulatorsare-looking-into-claims-that> [perma.cc/DT5J-4UE].
10. Amazonians United, supra note 9; O’Donovan, supra note 9. Te NLRB administers and
enforces the NLRA.
11. See e.g. Jones, supra note 8; Greenhouse, supra note 1; Lauren Kaori Gurley, “Fast Foods
Workers at 50 Restaurants Across California Are Going on Strike” Vice (8 April 2020),
online: <vice.com/en_us/article/7kzyxz/fast-foods-workers-at-30-restaurants-acrosscalifornia-are-going-on-strike> [perma.cc/F4GH-VB8H]; Matt Day, “Whole Foods Workers
Launch Sickout Protest. How Many Isn’t Clear” (31 March 2020), online: <bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2020-03-31/whole-foods-workers-launch-sick-out-protest-how-many-isn-tclear> [perma.cc/G5YJ-UDYD].
12. NLRA, supra note 5, §§ 7, 8(a)(1). As of 10 July 2020, multiple section 8(a)(1) ULP
charges have been fled against Amazon and McDonald’s restaurants and one has been fled
against Whole Foods. See O’Donovan, supra note 9; Tyler Sonnemaker, “Amazon is facing
multiple inquiries from labor regulators into whether it unlawfully retaliated against workers
who spoke out about its coronavirus response,” Business Insider (20 April 2020), online:
<businessinsider.com/amazon-nlrb-inquiries-workers-protests-coronavirus-warehouseconditions-2020-4> [perma.cc/J83T-PY2X].
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Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection.

II. WHAT ABOUT CANADIAN WORKERS?
Canadian media reporting on concerted actions by Whole Foods employees in
the US also reported on the lack of similar actions by workers at this company in
Canada.13 Reporting on Amazon worker strikes, a journalist posed the question,
“U.S. Workers Are Organizing Mass Strikes. Why Aren’t Canadian Workers?”14
Indeed, there have been no media reports of strikes by employees in Canada
during the pandemic at any of the prominent companies where we have seen
worker action in the US, such as Amazon, McDonald’s, and Whole Foods.
It is unlikely, however, that this is due to a lack of employee concerns about their
workplace safety. Tere are reports of dissatisfaction with workplace conditions
during the pandemic from Amazon workers in Canada, for example. In addition
to an online petition in support of non-unionized Amazon workers in the
Greater Toronto Area circulated by the non-union Warehouse Workers Centre
organization, some of these workers have spoken to media at various times about
their health and safety concerns, but did so confdentially and anonymously
“because they say they fear losing their job for speaking out,”15 “feared reprisal for
speaking to the media,”16 and with one worker saying “he’s certain he would be
terminated if Amazon knew he had gone public with his concerns. ‘You’d lose your

13. See Jackson & Shah, supra note 2 (“It’s not clear … whether a potential strike [by Instacart
workers] would extend into Canada”); Te Associated Press, “U.S. Amazon and Instacart
workers strike to protest COVID-19 hazards on the job,” CBC News (31 March 2020),
online: <cbc.ca/news/business/amazon-instacard-coronavirus-1.5515868> [perma.cc/
BW8T-SUE8] (“Whole Worker, a workers group for Whole Foods employees, is calling for
a country-wide ‘sick out’…. CBC News has been in touch with one of the organizers of the
strike in the U.S., who said she was unaware of any plans for similar actions in Canada”).
14. Noorsumar, supra note 3.
15. Philippe de Montigny, “Amazon employees fag health concerns in Canadian warehouses,”
CBC News (27 April 2020), online: <cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/amazon-covid19-ca
nada-1.5540594> [perma.cc/6LLV-PLJ8].
16. Sara Mojtehedzadeh, “As online orders surge, what about the Amazon workers?,” Te Toronto
Star (19 March 2020), online: <thestar.com/news/canada/2020/03/19/as-online-orderssurge-what-about-the-amazon-workers.html> [perma.cc/S4LH-MF8M].
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job for sure.’”17 More generally, concerns have been raised about the availability
and adequacy of employees’ ability to refuse unsafe work under occupational
health and safety legislation.18 Terefore, exploring the potential for employees
to utilize labour law to engage in self-help to secure safe working conditions,
as employees have been doing in the US, may be an important consideration
for ensuring adequate and timely workplace protection for Canadian employees.
While private sector, non-unionized workplaces in Canada have not seen
the types of collective employee action that has been prominent in similar
workplaces in the US during the pandemic, some protests by workers seeking
safer workplaces or access to pandemic pay have occurred, although these appear
to be uncommon. Where employee actions have occurred, several diferences
from the US experience are evident. First, in Canada, typically public sector,
unionized employees have been involved, as opposed to non-unionized, private
sector employees as has been the case in the US. Te nature of the action has also
been diferent: not only are Canadian employees rarely striking, but in some cases
employees or their organizations have taken pains to emphasize that their actions
are not strikes.
In the public sector, for example, unionized transit workers in Toronto,
Montreal, and Edmonton held spontaneous walk-outs or threats of strikes over

17. Sean O’Shea, “Ontario Amazon whistleblower says company didn’t disclose coronavirus
case to all,” Global News (5 May 2020), online: <globalnews.ca/news/6905042/
coronavirus-amazon-brampton-warehouse-covid-19> [perma.cc/JZR3-2AEV].
18. While the number of work refusals under the OHSA, RSO 1990, c O.1 in the province
rose during the pandemic, the Ministry of Labour, Training and Skills Development has
been subject to criticism for upholding only one of the 280 cases arising between January
and June 2020. Critics claim the Ministry has not taken worker concerns seriously. See Sara
Mojtehedzadeh, “Many Ontario workers are trying to refuse work due to COVID-19 fears—
but the government isn’t letting them,” Te Toronto Star (27 April 2020), online: <thestar.
com/business/2020/04/27/many-ontario-workers-are-trying-to-refuse-work-due-to-covid-19fears-but-the-government-isnt-letting-them.html> [perma.cc/VFE8-AGBD]; Inayat Singh,
“More Canadians are refusing work due to COVID-19—but it’s tough to get authorities
to agree,” CBC News (22 June 2020), online: <cbc.ca/news/canada/ work-refusal-safetycovid-1.5617787> [perma.cc/5TEP-ZYD2]; Canadian Federation of Nurses Unions,
“Nurses launch investigation into Canada’s failure to protect health care workers from
COVID-19” (22 June 2020), online: <nursesunions.ca/nurses-launch-investigation-intocanadas-failure-to-protect-health-care-workers-from-covid-19> [perma.cc/9ZVF-ES7U].
Although the occupational health and safety regime may be available to address workers’
health and safety concerns, this article does not address that regime.
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demands for safe working conditions and increased testing,19 while unionized
hospital workers have held several Ontario-wide days of action in response to the
lack of access to pandemic pay for all hospital workers. Tese protests have not
involved strikes, but rather the collective wearing of stickers, and holding up of
signs at coordinated times,20 and rallies by workers during non-working hours.21
Work stoppages have been rare.22 Notably, some doctors were reported to have
discussed, in private Facebook groups, the possibility of refusing to work due to
the lack of protective equipment.23 At a residential care home in Markham, the
majority of staf walked out after management informed them that a number of

19. Carl Bronski, “Walkouts by Canadian transit workers protest lack of COVID-19 protections”
World Socialist Web Site (20 April 2020), online: <wsws.org/en/articles/2020/04/20/ttcw-a20.
html> [perma.cc/5TZU-93BM]; Bryann Aguilar, “Eight TTC maintenance workers walk
of job as union demands more COVID-19 testing,” CTV News (18 April 2020), online:
<toronto.ctvnews.ca/eight-ttc-maintenance-workers-walk-of-job-as-union-demands-morecovid-19-testing-1.4902579> [perma.cc/N9U4-X5ME].
20. Aguilar, supra note 19; Canadian Union for Public Employees, “CUPE, SEIU, and UNIFOR
will Hold Day of Action on June 17 Calling for Pandemic Pay for All Hospital Workers” (15
June 2020), online: <cupehospitals.ca/news/cupe-seiu-and-unifor-will-hold-day-of-actionon-june-17-calling-for-pandemic-pay-for-all-hospital-workers> [perma.cc/Q9XD-29FF];
Taylor Blewett, “Ottawa hospital workers protest exclusion from pandemic pay,” Ottawa
Citizen (2 June 2020), online: <ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/ottawa-hospitalworkers-protest-exclusion-from-pandemic-pay> [perma.cc/NKZ8-72VU]; Ted Raymond,
“Health-Care Workers at Queensway Carleton to Protest Tursday for Expanded
Pandemic Pay in Hospitals” (14 May 2020), online: <iheartradio.ca/newstalk-1010/news/
health-care-workers-at-queensway-carleton-to-walk-out-thursday-in-support-of-expandedpandemic-pay-1.12410178> [perma.cc/9Y52-Z2PV]; Ontario Council of Hospital Unions
& Canadian Union of Public Employees, “Day of Action—May 6” (5 May 2020), online:
<ochu.on.ca/2020/05/05/day-of-action-may-6> [perma.cc/H57A-FNRL].
21. Blewett, supra note 20; Raymond, supra note 20; 101.3 myFM News staf, “COVID-19:
Hospital workers strike due to lack of pandemic pay,” 101.3 Milton Now (14 May 2020),
online: <www.miltonnow.ca/2020/05/14/covid-19-hospital-workers-strike-due-to-lack-ofpandemic-pay> [perma.cc/YM5J-TFTR].
22. CBC News, “‘State of emergency’ at Markham facility for adults with disabilities after staf
walk away over COVID-19,” CBC News (10 April 2020), online: <cbc.ca/news/ canada/
toronto/participation-house-critical-need-ppe-staf-1.5529384> [perma.cc/87MU-LQL9];
101.3 myFM News staf, supra note 21.
23. Stephen Maher, “Fear and anger on the frontlines: What happens if there aren’t enough
masks?” Maclean’s (30 March 2020), online: <macleans.ca/news/canada/fear-and-anger-onthe-frontlines-what-happens-if-there-arent-enough-masks> [perma.cc/4RJG-RWUJ] (“Some
Canadian doctors are talking about walking of the job if they’re not provided with adequate
equipment to protect themselves from infection”). Physicians in Canada are not unionized,
although provincial medical associations engage in collective representation and bargaining
on behalf of physicians.
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residents and staf had contracted COVID-19. However, a union representative
publicly stated that “[t]his was not a mass action, not a job action, not a strike.”24
Tere have been some instances of private sector, unionized employees taking
action.25 Perhaps most prominent has been the case of unionized meat-packing
employees. By early May 2020, Cargill’s High River Alberta meat-packing facility
was reported to be the site of North America’s largest COVID-19 outbreak.26
An early request for a stop work order from Alberta Occupational Health and
Safety was denied.27 In early May, as the plant moved towards re-opening following
temporary closure after the COVID-19 death of a worker, a multi-day protest
was held outside the High River plant, with participants from the employees’
union, the United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW), and other
union organizations.28 Notably, the UFCW stated “[w]e’re not on strike and
we’re not asking people not to go to work.”29 Te UFCW has also fled a ULP
complaint against the employer and the provincial government.30
24. CBC News, supra note 22.
25. Michael Wayland, “Work stoppage over coronavirus fears temporarily shuts down Fiat
Chrysler plant in Canada,” CNBC (13 March 2020), online: <www.cnbc.com/2020/03/13/
coronavirus-fat-chrysler-plant-workers-walk-out-in-canada.html> [perma.cc/C7M5-XTFA]
(automotive plant workers engaged in one-day strike over fears of infected co-worker); Nina
Grossman, “No sanitization, no workers: Victoria tradespeople walk of job,” Nanaimo News
Bulletin (21 March 2020), online: <www.nanaimobulletin.com/news/no-sanitization-noworkers-victoria-tradespeople-walk-of-job> [perma.cc/3DMX-L9KE] (construction workers
walked-of sites objecting to unsanitary working conditions).
26. “Meat Packers say Cargill Ignored their Concerns about Deadly COVID-19 Outbreak
at Alberta Slaughterhouse,” Press Progress (14 May 2020), online: <pressprogress.ca/
meat-packers-say-cargill-ignored-their-concerns-about-deadly-covid-19-outbreak-at-albertaslaughterhouse> [perma.cc/2BUL-J2RJ].
27. Kathryn Blaze Baum, Carrie Tait & Tavia Grant, “How Cargill became the site of Canada’s
largest single outbreak of COVID-19,” Te Globe and Mail (3 May 2020), online: <www.
theglobeandmail.com/business/article-how-cargill-became-the-site-of-canadas-largest-singleoutbreak-of> [perma.cc/UEN4-GFN2].
28. Stephanie Tomas, “Protests continue at Alberta’s Cargill meat processor where 949 workers
tested positive for COVID-19,” CTV News (6 May 2020), online: <calgary.ctvnews.ca/
protests-continue-at-alberta-s-cargill-meat-processor-where-949-workers-tested-positive-forcovid-19-1.4927353> [perma.cc/JJ39-MTXY].
29. Kaylen Small, Adam MacVicar & Melissa Gilligan, “Coronavirus: Cargill meat-packing
plant in High River, Alta., reopens amid ongoing talks with union,” Global News (3 May
2020), online: <globalnews.ca/news/6900280/coronavirus-cargill-union-talks-alberta>
[perma.cc/59B2-G46H].
30. United Food and Commercial Workers Canada Union, Local No 401 v Cargill Limited and
Government of Alberta (1 May 2020), online: <gounion.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/
UFCW-ULP-Complaint-to-ALRB-2020-05-01.pdf> [perma.cc/J2MK-3V3T]. As of this
writing, a decision has not been issued in this matter.
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Overall, what we have not seen in Canada are strikes by non-unionized,
private sector employees as a widespread phenomenon, which has been among
the most notable features of the phenomenon in the US.31

III. NLRA PROTECTION FOR CONCERTED ACTIVITY AND
FROM ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS CONDITIONS
Te NLRA is the primary collective bargaining statute in the US, applicable
to most of the private sector, providing rights and protections to workers who
satisfy the statutory defnition of “employee.”32 While the NLRA is commonly
criticized as being less protective of employee collective rights than is Canadian
labour law,33 not only does the NLRA difer from Canadian labour legislation in
several ways, but in some key respects it ofers greater protection to fundamental
employee rights.34
First, as Michael Duf has recently pointed out, it is a common, but mistaken,
belief that the NLRA applies only to unionized employees and workplaces.35
Neither unionization, nor the intention to unionize, is a requirement for access
to NLRA protections.36 Te NLRA ofers protection to non-unionized, private
31. Robert Combs, “Analysis: COVID-19 Has Workers Striking. Where Are the Unions?” (14
April 2020), online: <news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-COVID-19has-workers-striking-where-are-the-unions> [perma.cc/7KKE-UKGZ].
32. Excluded employees (such as public sector, agricultural and domestic workers, managers and
supervisors, railway and airline workers) and non-employee workers (such as independent
contractors) fall outside the scope of the NLRA and have no to access to its protections. See
NLRA, supra note 5, § 2(2). Public sector postal employees are an explicit exception to the
NLRA’s lack of coverage of public sector employees. See Postal Reorganization Act, 39 USC
§
101 (1970). Unlike Canadian labour law, discussed below, the NLRA does not regard
dependent contractors as employees, thus they are excluded from the Act.
33. See e.g. Jefrey Sack, “U.S. and Canadian Labour Law: Signifcant Distinctions” (2010) 25
ABA J Labor & Employment 241 at 241, 257; Fergal O’Brien & Zoe Schneeweiss, “U.S.
Ranked Worst for Workers’ Rights Among Major Economies” (18 June 2020), online:
<bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-18/u-s-ranked-worst-for-workers-rights-amongmajor-economies> [perma.cc/6Y7B-Z6ZW].
34. Lance A Compa, “Te Wagner Model and International Freedom of Association Standards”
in Autonomie collective et droit du travail: Melanges en l’honneur du Professor Pierre Verge ed by
Dominic Roux (Presses de l’Université Laval, 2014) 427 at 437.
35. Michael C Duf, “New Labor Viscerality? Work Stoppages in the ‘New Work,’ Non-Union
Economy” 65 St Louis U LJ [forthcoming in 2021], online: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3637605>, at 11.
36. See NLRB v Modern Carpet Indus, 611 F (2d) 811 at 813 (10th Cir 1979) [Modern Carpet];
Ontario Knife Co v NLRB, 637 F (2d) 840 at 843 (2d Cir 1980) [Ontario Knife]; NLRB v
Washington Aluminum Co, 370 US 9 (1962) [Washington Aluminum].
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sector employees, such as those engaging in the strikes and other collective actions
we have seen during the pandemic.37 Tere are two primary sources of protection
available under this legislation to both unionized and non-unionized employees
engaging in concerted action (including strikes due to health and safety concerns),
neither of which has a counterpart in Canadian labour legislation generally,
or the OLRA specifcally. Tese are the NLRA section 7 protected concerted
activity provision and the section 502 abnormally dangerous work provision.
As explained below, NLRA section 7 is of greater relevance to non-unionized
employees, so is given greater attention here.
A. PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY

NLRA section 7 provides that “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”38
Tese rights are held by individual employees, and apply to all employees within
the scope of the NLRA, whether or not they are unionized or even seeking
to unionize or engage in collective bargaining.39 Tese rights extend to eforts
to improve working conditions through “channels outside the immediate
employer-employee relationship,” including “resort to administrative and
judicial forums” and “appeals to legislators to protect their interests,”40 which can
apply even where employees have not approached their employers with specifc
demands or complaints before taking action,41 and employees need not be correct
in whole or in part regarding the underlying complaint motivating their action,
provided that they have acted in good faith.42
Limits to section 7 NLRA protection exist. Activity that is insubordinate,
disobedient, disloyal, illegal, destructive, or engaged in in an abusive manner
37. Sheppard, Mullin, Richert & Hampton LLP discussed an example of the lengthy list of
employee actions related to COVID-19 workplace concerns that may fall within the scope of
protected concerted activity. See Sheppard, Mullin, Richert & Hampton LLP, “Labor Issues
Concerning COVID-19 and Government ‘Stay at Home’ Orders” (20 March 2020), online:
<martindale.com/legal-news/article_sheppard-mullin-richter-hampton-llp_2527663.htm>
[perma.cc/9JCG-BUFL].
38. NLRA, supra note 5, § 157.
39. NLRB v Magnavox Co of Tennessee, 415 US 322 (1974); Modern Carpet, supra note 36;
Ontario Knife, supra note 36; Washington Aluminum, supra note 36.
40. Eastex Inc v NLRB, 437 US 556, 565-66 (1978).
41. See Washington Aluminum, supra note 36 at 14; NLRB v Empire Gas Inc, 566 F (2d) 681 at
684 (10th Cir 1977).
42. See Modern Carpet, supra note 36 at 814.
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may not be protected, and a balancing test is applied to determine whether these
limits have been reached.43 Te NLRB has found that collective employee actions
in protest over what employees honestly believe to be unsafe working conditions
can be protected concerted activity within the meaning of section 7.44 To fall
within section 7, the activity must be both “concerted” and for “mutual aid
or protection.”45 For activity to be considered “concerted,” the NLRB requires
“that it be engaged in with or on the authority of other employees, and not
solely by and on behalf of the employee himself.”46 However, activity need not
be supported by a majority of employees to be “concerted.”47 “Individual griping
and complaining” about an individual issue often fails to satisfy the “mutual
aid or protection” requirement, in addition to failing to be concerted activity.48
Tis does not exclude the possibility of individual employee actions qualifying
as concerted activity. In some circumstances, where it is not simply a complaint
about a matter of concern to an individual, actions of individual employees may
be considered to be concerted activity. Examples include where an individual,
though not a designated spokesperson, brings a group complaint to the attention
of management, and more generally, where there is evidence of group activities
even if not “specifcally authorized” in a formal sense; where individuals “seek
to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action”; where individuals bring
“truly group complaints” to management’s attention; and where individual
activity is “looking toward group action.”49 Te NLRB recently clarifed that
“individual griping” does not constitute concerted activity simply where it occurs
in the presence of other employees and management, and that it “includes the
use of the frst-person plural pronoun” unless it is truly a group complaint being
43. See Atlantic Steel, 245 NLRB 814 (1979); NLRB v IBEW Local No 1229, 346 US 464
(1953); Mastro Plastics Corp v National Labor Relations Bd, 350 US 270 (1956).
44. Tamara Foods Inc, 258 NLRB 1307 (1981) [Tamara]. “It has long been established that
Section 7 of the Act protects the rights of employees to engage in protests, including work
stoppages, over what the employees believe to be unsafe or unhealthy working conditions”
(ibid at 1308).
45. Alstate Maintenance LLC, 367 NLRB No 68 at 2 (2019).
46. Meyers Industries, Inc, 268 NLRB 493 (1984) [Meyers I]; see also Ontario Knife, supra
note 36 at 845.
47. NLRB v Jasper Seating Co, 857 F (2d) 419 at 422 (7th Cir 1988) cited in Duf, supra note 35
at 11 (“Nothing in the Act, however, limits the rights of non-unionized employees to engage
in concerted conduct for their mutual aid regardless of whether or not their goal is supported
by a majority of employees”).
48. Rita Gail Smith & Richard A Parr II, “Protection of Individual Action as Concerted Activity
under the National Labor Relations Act” (1982) 68 Cornell L Rev 369 at 375.
49. Meyers I, supra note 46; Ontario Knife, supra note 36 at 844-45; Meyers Industries Inc, 281
NLRB 882 at 886-87 (1986) [Meyers II].
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brought to management’s attention, or the “totality of the circumstances must
support a reasonable inference that in making the statement, the employee was
seeking to initiate, induce or prepare for group action.” Te NLRB identifed
several factors that would tend to support such an inference.50
Te “mutual aid or protection” component of NLRA section 7 has been
interpreted broadly such that it includes “almost any activity that somehow
afects the well-being of the employees as a group.”51 Tough wide-reaching,
this element is still meaningful as some concerted activities fail this second
requirement because they have unprotected objectives that do not qualify as
“mutual aid and protection.”52
ULP provisions, found in section 8, address violations of NLRA section 7
rights. While other section 8 ULPs may also apply in a particular case, section
8(a)(1) speaks specifcally to section 7, providing that an employer must not
“interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7.”53 Te NLRB General Counsel initially bears the burden
of proving, prima facie, that protected concerted activity was a substantial or
motivating factor in the employer’s impugned action.54 A causal relationship must
exist between the protected activity and the impugned employer action.55 Te
burden then shifts to the employer to demonstrate that it would have engaged
in the same action in the absence of the protected activity.56 Employer action
partially motivated by the protected activity will be sufcient to fnd a breach of
section 8(a)(1).57

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

56.
57.

Alstate Maintenance LLC, supra note 45 at 7.
Smith & Parr, supra note 48 at 374.
Ibid.
NLRA, supra note 5, § 158. ULP charges relating to protected concerted activity are generally
brought pursuant to sections 8(a)(1) or 8(a)(3).
NLRB v Wright Line, a Div of Wright Line Inc (1980), 251 NLRB 1083, af’d 662 F (2d) 899
(1st Cir 1981). Te certifcation was then later denied. See NLRB v Wright Line, 455 US 989
(1982) [Wright Line].
Te Wright Line test was recently clarifed such that “To meet the General Counsel’s initial
burden, the evidence of animus must support fnding that a causal relationship exists
between the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s adverse action against the
employee.” Tschiggfrie Properties, 368 NLRB No. 120 at 1 (2019).
Wright Line, supra note 54.
See NLRB v Elias Bros. Restaurants Inc, 496 F (2d) 1165 at 1167 (6th Cir 1974); Jim Causley
Pontiac v NLRB, 620 F (2d) 122 at 126 (6th Cir 1980).
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B. PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY AND STRIKES

NLRA section 13 provides an express statutory right to strike, although limits
exist on legal strikes, depending on the object, purpose, timeliness, or conduct of
strikers.58 Without canvassing the full complexities of NLRA strike law, it can be
said that it contains roughly similar limitations on lawful strikes as does Canadian
labour law,59 although several features of strikes under the NLRA that difer
from the Canadian approach merit mention here. First, unlike under Canadian
labour legislation, “no-strike” provisions prohibiting strikes during the term of
a collective agreement or imposing procedural requirements for a strike to be
lawful are not found in the NLRA, but are generally negotiated in agreements.60
Where a strike breaches a no-strike provision, it is not protected activity. In such
cases, striking employees can be disciplined, including terminated without the
employer committing a ULP.61 Strike activity can also fall within the scope of
NLRA section 7, including strikes over unsafe working conditions, which can
protect strikers, including non-unionized employees, from employer retaliation,
termination, or permanent replacement.62
Second, under the NLRA, striking employees have less protection from
permanent replacement than under Canadian labour law. Te NLRB distinguishes
between lawful strikes that are either “economic” or “ULP”; employees’ rights
to return to work vary with the type of strike, and a strike may convert from
one type to another.63 Economic strikes seek to gain an economic concession
from the employer, including improved working conditions. Economic strikers
cannot be terminated, although they can be permanently replaced and they have
limited rights to reinstatement. In contrast, ULP strikes respond to an action
by the employer. ULP strikers cannot be terminated nor permanently replaced
58. Section 13 provides that “[n]othing in this Act … except as specifcally provided for
herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way
the right to strike or to afect the limitations or qualifcations on that right.” See National
Labor Relations Board, “Te Right to Strike” (n.d.), online: <www.nlrb.gov/strikes>
[perma.cc/66TG-82FV].
59. Treatment of secondary strikes is a notable exception but not addressed here as it is not
germane to this discussion. See also Brishen Rogers & Simon Archer, “Protecting Concerted
Action Outside the Union Context” (2017) 20 Can Lab & Emp LJ 141 at 153-54 (general
discussion of strikes).
60. See e.g. OLRA, supra note 6, ss 46, 79. An exception is NLRA, § 8(g) (imposing a pre-strike
notice period for health care workers).
61. National Labor Relations Board, supra note 58.
62. See Washington Aluminum, supra note 36; Tamara, supra note 44.
63. In contrast, Canadian labour law provides more substantial rights to return to work and
protection from permanent replacement. See e.g. OLRA, supra note 6, s 80 (reinstatement).
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and they have greater rights to reinstatement than economic strikers.64 Tis
applies to both unionized and non-unionized striking employees. NLRA section
7 strikes, particularly the pandemic strikes addressed here, are likely considered
to be economic strikes, as they seek to compel the employer to improve
working conditions.
Finally, unlike Canadian labour law, the NLRB distinguishes between
“repeated” strikes, in which each incidence relates to a separate employer act or
problem, which are protected, and “intermittent” strikes, which don’t relate to a
separate employer act or problem, and which are utilized for the purpose of being
more damaging to the employer or less taxing for the employees. Tese types of
strikes are not protected.65 Describing the boundary between protected repeated
strikes and unprotected intermittent strikes as “hazy,” Duf notes that this could
be problematic for non-unionized employees, as they may not realize that such a
distinction exists.66
In sum, NLRA section 7 protection of strike activity may be available
to unionized employees without a “no-strike” clause and to non-unionized
employees, but is not available to non-employees or workers otherwise outside
of the scope of the NLRA. However, as detailed by Brishen Rogers and Simon
Archer, protected concerted activity, at least as it operates within the NLRA, has
several important shortcomings including: limitations on the scope of protected
conduct; imbalance between employers’ and employees’ entitlements; inadequate
enforcement and remedies; and the de jure or de facto exclusion of many workers
from the scope of the legislation.67
C. STRIKES AND ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS CONDITIONS

A second NLRA provision available to protect both unionized and non-unionized
employees who are within the scope of the NLRA is the seldom litigated section
502. It operates to prevent employee actions that would otherwise constitute a
strike under the NLRA from being considered to be a strike, converting them
into a non-strike work stoppage for the purposes of the Act by providing that:
64. National Labor Relations Board, supra note 58.
65. See Duf, supra note 35 at 18-19. Duf provides a detailed explanation of these principles. See
also Walmart Stores Inc, 368 NLRB No 24 (2019). Duf contends that this recent decision
may expand the application of the intermittent strike concept.
66. Duf, supra note 35 at 11, 18, 29. Duf outlines recommendations for an explicit rebuttable
presumption to apply in such cases.
67. Rogers & Archer, supra note 59 at 153-60. Te authors also identify some limitations arising
from competition law and common law. See also Duf, supra note 35 at 9, 46-47. Duf
outlines competition law constraints, particularly with respect to independent contractors.
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the quitting of labor by an employee or employees in good faith because of
abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of employment of such
employee or employees [shall not] be deemed a strike under this Act.68

Protecting a work stoppage from constituting a strike under the NLRA is
particularly signifcant for unionized employees with “no-strike” clauses in their
collective agreements, because the employees will then not have violated this
agreement provision and, therefore, they will not be subject to an injunction,
civil liability, permanent replacement, or termination, although employers can
still use temporary replacement workers.69
In order for section 502 to protect a work stoppage, it must be demonstrated
on a preponderance of evidence that:
the employees believed in good-faith that their working conditions were abnormally
dangerous; that their belief was a contributing cause of the work stoppage; that
the employees’ belief is supported by ascertainable, objective evidence; and that the
perceived danger posed an immediate threat of harm to employee health or safety.70

An “abnormally dangerous” working condition is an “identifable, presently
existing threat to the employees’ safety,” though can include “risks that are
ordinarily present [that have] intensifed,” but don’t include risks that are inherent
in the job.71 Neither a “subjective impression or danger” nor a “speculative doubt
about safety in general” will be sufcient.72 Notably, safety concerns need not be
the sole motivation for the work stoppage,73 and there is no requirement that the
activity be concerted; therefore, it is available to individual employees.
D. NLRA PROTECTIONS FOR STRIKERS

In sum, the NLRA contains two provisions—section 7 protected concerted activity
and section 502 abnormally dangerous conditions work stoppages—which can
be relevant to strike activity and to health and safety related strikes in particular.
Tese provisions operate in diferent ways. NLRA section 7, applicable to a
broad array of concerted action for mutual aid or protection, provides protection
68. NLRA, supra note 5, §143.
69. Duf, supra note 35 at 16; TNS Inc, 329 NLRB 602 (1999) [TNS Inc].
70. Ibid. See also Gateway Coal Co v United Mine Workers of America, 414 US 368 at 386-87
(1974) [Gateway].
71. Gateway, supra note 70 at 386; TNS Inc, supra note 69 at 607; Carl H Coleman, “Beyond
the Call of Duty: Compelling Health Care Professionals to Work during an Infuenza
Pandemic” (2008) 94 Iowa L Rev 1 at 16.
72. TNS Inc, supra note 69 at 607.
73. Ibid.
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to strike activity, sheltering employees from retaliation and employment
consequences through the ULP provisions. It requires only a good-faith belief by
employees in the complaint underlying the action, which need not be objectively
reasonable or wholly correct. Section 502 applies only to employee action that
would otherwise be a strike, causing it to be treated as a non-strike work stoppage
instead, thereby protecting employees from consequences of an unlawful strike,
which would arise from violating a “no-strike” collective agreement clause.
Te test for section 502 protection is more stringent than that for section 7.
Te section 7 test is “essentially a subjective standard,” while section 502 work
refusals must be based on “ascertainable, objective evidence of an abnormally
dangerous condition.”74 Section 502 requires a good-faith belief in “abnormally
dangerous” working conditions posing an immediate threat, and demonstration
of “ascertainable, objective evidence.”75 Terefore, section 502 is of greater use to
unionized employees with a “no-strike” clause in their collective agreements. Both
provisions are available to unionized employees and non-unionized employees
alike. Non-employee workers— such as independent contractors, or those
excluded from application of the Act—do not have access to these protections.

IV. EMPLOYEE FREEDOMS AND STRIKES UNDER CANADIAN
LABOUR LAW
Utilizing the OLRA as broadly representative of Canadian labour legislation,
this section outlines the opportunities, protections, and consequences for three
categories of workers engaging in strikes over fears of workplace safety: unionized
employees, non-unionized employees, and workers such as non-employees who
are excluded from the Act.
Te modern era of Canadian collective bargaining legislation commenced
with passage of PC 1003 in 1944, which became the model for legislation in
jurisdictions across the country. PC 1003 adopted elements of the original
US “Wagner Act” NLRA, passed in 1935.76 Consequently, Canadian labour
legislation is commonly referred to as “Wagner model” legislation. However,
labour legislation in Canada developed in a very diferent social, economic, and
74. Tese contrast with the subjective-objective standard required for occupational health and
safety work refusal, which must be both in good faith and have a reasonable basis. See Mark
A Rothstein, Occupational Safety and Health Law, 2020 ed (Tomson West) § 20:6.
75. TNS Inc, supra note 69.
76. “Wagner model,” refers to the US NLRA as it was originally passed in 1935, refecting the
name of its key sponsor, Senator Wagner.
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political context than had the NLRA, and it departs from the Wagner model
and the current NLRA in several important respects, particularly with regard
to the scope of employee freedoms and regulation of strikes.77 In contrast with
the NLRA’s emphasis on statutory rights, Canadian labour legislation focused
on ensuring industrial peace, and suppressing strikes and worker militancy. Te
fundamental deal struck with labour in modern Canadian collective bargaining
legislation is that union recognition and collective bargaining are provided in
exchange for restrictive union certifcation and strikes.78 Tese diferences in
orientation and purpose are refected in the texts of the statutes, and several of
these diferences are crucial to this discussion.
In addition to the narrower scope of application of the legislation addressed
above,79 the three statutory elements relevant to strikes in Canadian labour
legislation are addressed below: the fundamental freedoms provision; limits
and preconditions for lawful strikes, giving rise to an implied right to strike;
protections for unionized employees in a legal strike, including that employment
is not deemed to cease due to striking, in conjunction with right to return to work
protections and ULP protections for employee freedom and rights under the Act.
Treatment by the OLRA of strikes by non-unionized workers is then addressed.
A. FREEDOM TO JOIN AND PARTICIPATE IN A TRADE UNION

Te OLRA analogue to the NLRA section 7 protected concerted activity
provision, as the linchpin of employee rights in the statute, is section 5 of the
OLRA. As interpreted by the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB), section
5 promises that every employee “is free to join a trade union of the person’s
own choice and to participate in its lawful activities.”80 As such, it guarantees a
signifcantly narrower scope of activities than does section 7, with the scope of

77. See John Godard, “Labour Law and Union Recognition in Canada: A HistoricalInstitutionalist Perspective” (2013) 38 Queen’s LJ 391 (presenting a historical-institutionalist
analysis of the reasons for and future implications of these diferences); Barry Eidlin, Labor
and the Class Idea in the United States and Canada (Cambridge University Press, 2018)
(examining the origins of these diferences).
78. Eidlin, supra note 77 at 233-34; see also Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, “Te Freedom to Strike
in Canada: A Brief Legal History” (2009) 15 Can Lab & Emp LJ 333 at 348-52.
79. See Part III of this article, supra.
80. Although section 5 speaks of “every person,” the OLRB interprets this section as applying
only to “employees.” See Brian Langille, “What Is a Strike” (2009) 15 Can Lab & Emp LJ
355 at 365-66, citing Communications Workers of Canada v AAS Telecommunications Ltd,
[1976] OLRB Rep 751; Jarvis v Associated Medical Services Inc, [1964] SCR 497.
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protection limited to union-related activity by employees, and does not address
non-unionized collective employee activities other than seeking to unionize.
Te basic structure of the OLRA is that employees (including dependent
contractors) fall within the statute, unless they are explicitly excluded. Common
exclusions are managers, confdential labour relations workers, and specifed
occupational and professional exclusions.81 Under the OLRA, excluded workers
cannot be “employees” within the meaning of the Act and, therefore, are not
subject to provisions applicable only to employees.82 Te Act is administered and
enforced by the OLRB.
B. REGULATION OF STRIKES

In contrast with section 13 of the NLRA, the right to strike is not explicitly
included in Canadian labour legislation or common law. Instead, as George
Adams says, it “seems to have been implied into existence.”83 Te legislation
incorporates a broad view of what constitutes strike activity. In common with
almost all Canadian jurisdictions, the OLRA contains an “objective” defnition
of strike: “includ[ing] a cessation of work, a refusal to work or to continue
to work by employees in combination or in concert or in accordance with a
common understanding, or a slow-down or other concerted activity on the part
of employees designed to restrict or limit output.”84

81. OLRA, supra note 6, ss 1(3), 3. According to Langille, employees coming within each of
these types of exclusions are treated the same by the OLRA with respect to strikes. See
Langille, supra note 80.
82. Langille, supra note 80.
83. George W Adams, Canadian Labour Law, 2nd ed (Aurora, ON: Canada Law Book, 1993)
(loose-leaf, updated 2020, release 80) at 11.90. However, the Supreme Court of Canada
recently recognized strikes as falling within the scope of the Charter s 2(d) guarantee of
freedom of association, accepting that strikes are a necessary part of the process of collective
bargaining. See Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4.
84. OLRA, supra note 6, s 1. In contrast, collective bargaining legislation in Alberta, Manitoba,
and Nova Scotia include a “subjective” element in the defnition of “strike,” requiring that
the activity have as a purpose compelling the employer to settle a collective agreement. See
Labour Relations Code, RSA 2000, c L-1, s 1(v); Labour Relations Act, RSM 1987, c L10,
s 1; Trade Union Act, RSNS 1989, c 475, s 2(1)(v). Few jurisdictions exclude specifed types
of activity from being considered a strike. Only British Columbia and New Brunswick
exempt legal work refusals pursuant to workplace health and safety legislation from the strike
defnition. See Labour Relations Code, RSBC 1996, c 244, s 1(1) [BC Labour Relations Code];
Industrial Relations Act, RSNB 1973, c I-4, s 1(1)). However, a work stoppage based on a
“disingenuous” safety concern can constitute a strike even in those jurisdictions. See Southam
Inc, BCLRB No. B263/2000, rev’d in part BCLRB No. B328/2001.
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Although the defnition of strike is broad, and the legislation provides that
employment is not deemed to cease only by reasons of striking, an array of
statutory restrictions means that a strike is lawful only in limited circumstances.85
Strikes are statutorily prohibited during the term of a collective agreement, and a
“no-strike” provision must be included in every agreement and is deemed to exist
should the agreement fail to include it.86 Even when an agreement has expired,
two statutory preconditions must be satisfed for a strike to be lawful: a successful
strike vote authorizing a strike, and exhaustion of the statutory conciliation
process.87 Some jurisdictions also require advance written notice of strike
commencement.88 In contrast, as noted above, such limitations on lawful strike
activity are not found in the NLRA, though they may be found in voluntarily
negotiated “no-strike” collective agreement provisions.
Te combined efect of the strike defnition and preconditions for lawful
strikes is that the OLRA, in common with legislation in other Canadian
jurisdictions, only allows for one type of lawful strike—a bargaining strike—and
only in certain, limited circumstances. In contrast, as described above, the NLRA
contemplates a wider variety of potentially lawful or protected strikes: recognition
and ULP strikes during the term of the agreement, in addition to economic
strikes (a category including but broader than Canadian “bargaining” strikes).89
C. OLRA PROTECTION FOR UNIONIZED STRIKERS

Te OLRA guarantees employees the freedom to participate in lawful union
activities and explicitly recognizes that the employment relationship continues
to exist during lawful strikes.90 Striking employees also have substantial return to
work rights that, in combination with ULP prohibitions and remedies, provide
lawfully striking employees with broad protection from employer retaliation,
including permanent replacement.91
Employees engaged in lawful strikes are protected from employer retaliation
and negative employment consequences by the statute’s ULP provisions; such
strikes are lawful union activity guaranteed by the basic statutory section 5
85. OLRA, supra note 6, s 1(2).
86. OLRA, supra note 6, s 79(1). Mandatory grievance arbitration, rather than a strike, is the
mid-term dispute resolution mechanism under the Canadian system.
87. See e.g. OLRA, supra note 6, ss 79, 79.1.
88. See e.g. BC Labour Relations Code, supra note 84, s 60(6).
89. “Recognition” refers to employer recognition of a union as the bargaining representative of a
group of workers. See Langille, supra note 80 at 360-61 (for a detailed discussion).
90. See e.g. OLRA, supra note 6, ss 1(2), 5.
91. See e.g. ibid, s 80.
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freedom.92 For example, section 72 of the OLRA prohibits employer interference
with this freedom by prohibiting an employer from: refusing to employ or
continue to employ, or to discriminate against an employee for exercising his or
her rights under the OLRA; imposing contract conditions that seek to restrain
an employee from joining a union; and, using threats, promises, or other means
to compel an employee not to join or to cease membership in a union or not
exercise other rights under the OLRA.93
A reverse onus applies to the main ULP provisions, such that the employer
must establish on the balance of probabilities that its impugned conduct did not
have an improper motive—that is, that it was not motivated in whole or in part
by anti-union animus or related to union activity.94 Labour boards have broad
jurisdiction to award compensatory remedies for ULP violations. An important
limitation, and a key diference between US and Canadian collective bargaining
legislation, is that these protections are available to employees during union
organizing and once unionized, but not to employees who are neither unionized
nor in the process of seeking union representation.95
In the case of an unlawful strike, in addition to consequences for a union,
individual employees may be subject to discipline, may be found to have violated
statutory prohibitions on doing anything to cause an illegal strike, or may
contravene a board illegal strike declaration or cease and desist order. Individuals
or unions violating the legislation or any labour board decision, order, direction,
or similar are subject to signifcant statutory monetary penalties, which accrue
on a daily basis for each day that the contravention continues.96 Meanwhile the
collective agreement and grievance arbitration machinery continue to apply, and
the employer may still utilize the doctrine of fundamental breach.97
92. Canadian Pacifc Railway Co v Zambri, [1962] SCR 609 [Zambri] (strikes are protected by
the s 5 freedom).
93. OLRA, supra note 6, s 72; Adams, supra note 83 at para 10.110. Additional ULP
provisions prohibit: employer participation in or interference with the formation; selection
or administration of, or representation by, a trade union (OLRA, supra note 6, s 70);
intimidation or coercion to compel any person regarding union membership or exercising
rights or obligations under the OLRA (ibid, s 76); persuading during working hours to
join or not join a union (ibid, s 77); direct employer bargaining with union members (ibid,
s 73(1)); or, strike-breaking activities (ibid, s 78(1)).
94. OLRA, supra note 6, s 96(5); Adams, supra note 83 at para 10.120.
95. Rogers & Archer, supra note 59 at 148.
96. See e.g. OLRA, supra note 6, s 104.
97. OLRA, supra note 6, s 83; Adams, supra note 83 at para 11.90; McGavin Toastmaster v
Ainscough, [1976] 1 SCR 718. Additional consequences outside of labour law, including
competition law, common law tort, and contract law, may also be relevant.
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D. STRIKES BY NON-UNIONIZED WORKERS UNDER THE OLRA

It is clear that the full array of protections and consequences under the OLRA is
available to unionized employees engaging in lawful or unlawful strikes. However,
whether and to what extent there exists a right to strike, and consequences for
unlawful strikes, by non-unionized employees or for workers excluded from the
statutory regime (such as independent contractors), are much more complicated
questions under Canadian labour law than under the NLRA.98 Brian Langille
notes that this is an “obscure” part of our law, and that “the dominance of the
statutory scheme has orphaned any real legal analysis of strikes outside the statute,
i.e., at common law. As a result, most of us have forgotten how to think about
these matters.”99
So, where does this leave workers who are explicitly excluded from the
OLRA, non-employees such as independent contractors, and workers who are
employees but not unionized nor seeking to unionize?
1.

STRIKES BY WORKERS EXCLUDED FROM THE OLRA

Employees explicitly excluded from the OLRA do not have the beneft of section 5
employee freedoms, which includes the freedom to strike.100 As a result, they lack
the beneft of the basic ULP provisions. In the same way that the NLRA section
8(a)(1) ULP provision refects the specifc language of NLRA section 7, the main
OLRA ULPs (sections 72 and 76) refect section 5, including the specifc and far
narrower language of the freedoms provided compared to the NLRA section 7.
Te OLRA provides employees only the freedom to “join a trade union of [their]
own choice and to participate in its lawful activities.” Correspondingly, the ULP
provisions protect these freedoms, including other rights under the Act, from
various types of violations: threats, promises, terminations, et cetera. What the
OLRA neither promises as a freedom nor promises to protect are other forms of
collective activity for workers ineligible to access section 5 freedoms.101
98. Tis article does not address the Charter with respect to these questions, although see the
conclusion for some comments in this regard.
99. Langille, supra note 80 at 356.
100. OLRA, supra note 6, ss 1(3), 3. Section 1(3) provides that certain persons—such as managers,
confdential employees, and specifed professionals—shall not be deemed to be “employees”;
s 3 provides that the OLRA does not apply to certain occupations or specifed groups.
101. Te main ULP provisions apply to persons, and section 97 of OLRA specifes that this
includes non-employees excluded by section 1(3) but not those excluded by section 3.
However, because ULPs efectuate the section 5 freedoms and the OLRB continues to
interpret the section 5 freedoms as applying only to “employees,” the result is that neither
category of excluded worker, in efect, has protection of the main ULP provisions. See OLRA,
supra note 6, ss 1(3), 3, 5, 97; Langille, supra note 80 at 362-69.
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However, these workers are not subject to the timeliness restrictions on legal
strikes, which only apply to “employees.” Terefore, these workers are free of
any statutory restrictions on strikes but are also free of any statutory protections
for strikes.102 Consequently, these workers are governed by common law, and
may face common law consequences for strike activity,103 as well as consequences
arising from non-labour statutes, such as competition law. Langille describes the
common law right to strike as follows:
[I]t is the freedom of a group of workers, playing by the rules of contract termination,
and acting for a certain purpose (i.e., (re)negotiations of their contract with the
employer), to stop working in an efort to get the employer to come to terms. …
But it is purely a freedom at common law, and one not protected by a perimeter of
rights.104

Langille asserts that, therefore, the key distinction between the statutory and
common law freedoms to strike is the protection aforded by ULP provisions
to the former.105 Workers subject only to the common law freedom to strike
have no protection from employer retaliation or termination, and the employer
has no obligation to reinstate or not to terminate these workers except as may
arise from these workers’ individual contracts of employment or for service
with the employer.
2.

STRIKES BY NON-EMPLOYEES

For the same reasons (lack of access to section 5 statutory freedom to strike,
with the consequent lack of protection for this freedom), non-employees such
as independent contractors would be in the same position as workers explicitly
excluded from the OLRA. As described above, they would be subject to the
common law freedom to strike, and would be subject to all of the risks and
consequences this might bring.
3.

STRIKES BY NON-UNIONIZED EMPLOYEES

What, then, is the position of non-unionized employees who are not otherwise
excluded from the OLRA? Tis may be the trickiest question, and it is the one
most central to this inquiry. Unlike the types of workers described above (those
excluded by sections 1(3) or 3 of the Act, or who are not “employees” within the
102. Langille, supra note 80 at 364; OLRA, supra note 6, ss 1(3), 3. Langille is referring to workers
excluded pursuant to the OLRA, ss 1(3), 3.
103. Langille, supra note 80 at 368.
104. Ibid at 368-69, citing Zambri, supra note 92.
105. Ibid at 369.
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meaning of the Act), non-unionized employees likely have access to the section
5 freedoms, including the freedom to strike, even under the OLRB’s restrictive
reading of this provision, and the main ULPs are available to such employees.
So, on the face of it, it appears that these non-unionized employees may be in a
similar situation as they would be under section 7 of the NLRA. Tis is the case,
insofar as section 5 freedoms apply. As noted above, however, these freedoms are
much narrower than the NLRA section 7 protected concerted activity guarantee.
With regard to strikes, OLRA section 5 only includes lawful strikes as a form
of “participation in lawful union activity,” and the relevant ULP protections,
similarly, protect only lawful strikes. Terefore, only strikes that constitute a
lawful activity of a trade union would fall within OLRA section 5 or the ULP
provisions meant to ensure those freedoms.
Assuming that non-unionized employees would not, or could not, satisfy the
statutory prerequisites for a lawful strike applicable to employees, such a strike
would not be lawful. Terefore, the fundamental freedom of union membership
and ULP provisions would not be available to ofer these employees any recourse
for or protection from employer retaliation, including discipline or discharge.106
Tis lack of protection or recourse is true, more generally, of collective action
taken by non-unionized employees in Canada and is not limited to strike
activity. Minimum standards legislation and the common law of employment,
to the extent that it would be applicable in any given case, would be their only
recourse.107 Consequently, non-unionized employees would end up in the same
position as excluded workers and non-employees—able only to exercise the
common law freedom to strike, without statutory protections and with all the
risks and liabilities this may bring.

V. REVISITING PANDEMIC-RELATED STRIKES IN THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA
Returning to the pandemic-related worker actions in the US and Canada
described at the outset of this article, the apparent diferences between the
countries in workers’ collective protests against unsafe working conditions can be
explained by key diferences between US and Canadian labour legislation.
106. Given the focus here on labour law, consequences of unlawful strike activity beyond labour
law are not addressed here.
107. See Langille, supra note 80 (regarding Canadian common law perspectives on strike activity).
See Rogers & Archer, supra note 59 at 148 (for a summary of minimum standards legislation
anti-retaliation provisions).
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In the US, there were multiple incidents of non-unionized employees
engaging in multiple forms of collective actions, including single-location
and mass strikes. Some employees involved did sufer negative employment
consequences and have claimed employer retaliation for participating in these
actions. In many of these cases, it is likely that the NLRA section 7 protected
concerted activity guarantee is applicable, which can be enforced through the
Act’s ULP provisions. Indeed, media reports that multiple ULP charges have
been fled in many of these cases.
Addressing some of the same US pandemic work stoppages discussed here,
Duf notes that NLRA section 7 protection likely protects those strikes relating
to health and safety, as they are concerted activity that has a “tight connection
to work condition.”108 However, writing in 2008, Carl Coleman considered
whether risks arising from a pandemic would qualify as “abnormally dangerous”
in health care workplaces, specifcally. He suggested that most of these workers
could credibly claim that to be the case, but speculated that the courts may focus
on foreseeable risk rather than on whether it is out of the ordinary, in which case
health care work in a pandemic would not likely satisfy section 502.109
While NLRA section 502 may also be available in such cases, as explained
above, the beneft of the “non-strike work stoppage” designation this provision
provides is primarily of value to unionized workers with “no-strike” provisions
in their collective agreements. Given the limited scope of application and more
onerous test for application of NLRA section 502 compared to section 7, it is more
likely that these non-union actions were undertaken, or subsequently defended,
pursuant to the protected concerted activity provision of the NLRA. Terefore,
these non-unionized employees engaging in strikes were doing so with the same
protection as (and, compared to unionized employees, subject to a “no-strike”
clause, greater freedom than) unionized employees.
In contrast, in Canada, we have not seen pandemic-related strikes by either
non-unionized or unionized employees. Indeed, some non-unionized employees
sought out media to publicize their concerns, expressing fear of employer
retaliation. Even in the context of unionized workplaces, we have seen unions
explicitly state that their actions were not strikes.
As outlined above, and unlike under the NLRA, the scope for lawful,
statutorily protected strike action is very narrow under Canadian labour law.
Non-unionized employees have no means of accessing statutory strike protection.
In the case of unionized employees, unless no collective agreement was in force
108. Duf, supra note 35 at 15.
109. Coleman, supra note 71 at 16.
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and the various preconditions for a lawful strike had been satisfed (and they
most likely were not in these cases), any strike would have been illegal, exposing
the union and employees to an array of consequences. Terefore, non-unionized
workers in Canada would be very unlikely to strike and would have no statutory
labour law protection from employer retaliation or negative employment
consequences, and so are likely very wary of taking any public action. Te limited
scope for lawful strikes and the signifcant consequences to unions and employees
of unlawful strikes are clear in the case of unionized employees, and explain why
we have seen unions with unionized employees engaging in pandemic collective
action emphasize that these actions were not strikes.

VI. CONTEMPLATING PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY
FOR CANADIAN EMPLOYEES
As William Corbett notes, “Te scope of coverage of section 7 and its application
to non-union employees may have been one of the best-kept secrets of labor law.
It also may be one of the best means for protecting employee rights in the United
States in the twenty-frst century.”110 Moreover, Lance Compa has pointed out
that NLRA concerted activity protections are even more favourable to workers
than International Labour Organization (ILO) standards because they protect
“any form of ‘concerted activity … for mutual aid and protection,’ not just
union activity.”111
Others, including more recently Rogers and Archer, have suggested that
Canadian labour legislation be amended to incorporate protection akin to the
NLRA’s protected concerted activity provision.112 Focusing on the scope for such an
amendment to support activities of workers’ centres that represent non-unionized
employees, these authors didn’t address in detail necessary ancillary amendments,
or strike regulation, in particular. However, Rogers and Archer contend that the
“roughly symmetrical” relevant norms and processes under Canadian and US
labour legislation suggest that there would be no signifcant impediments to
adopting a provision similar to NLRA section 7 into Canadian labour legislation,
and that such an addition would not signifcantly disrupt Canadian labour law
or labour relations.113 Tey further suggest that such an amendment would be
110. William R Corbett, “Waiting For the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century: Everything
Old Is New Again” (2002) 23 Berkeley J Emp & Lab L 259 at 267.
111. Compa, supra note 34 at 437.
112. Rogers & Archer, supra note 59.
113. Ibid at 160-61.
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consistent with Canada’s international law commitments and with the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms guarantee of freedom of association.114
If Canadian labour legislation, such as the OLRA, was to be amended to
include a guarantee of protection for concerted activity, what might that entail,
not only with respect to statutory strikes, but also for other elements of the
Canadian Wagner model? First, some straightforward technical amendments to
the freedoms provision and to key ULP provisions would be necessary. Second,
if this guarantee is to extend covering strikes as a form of protected concerted
activity, some more complex changes and policy decisions would be necessary.
Tese would include the scope of application of labour legislation including
the nature of collective worker action it contemplates, and whether to provide a
concrete foundation for minority unionism in labour legislation.
A. ESTABLISHING THE GUARANTEE

In order to establish protection for concerted activity, it would be necessary to
amend the employee freedoms provision (section 5) to cover the more expansive
range of activities encompassed by the NLRA section 7, reaching beyond
organizing and collective bargaining to employee actions for “mutual aid or
protection.” Such an amendment could simply involve adopting the language of
section 7 in place of, or in addition to, the existing employee freedom language.
As noted earlier, although the existing OLRA freedom provision applies to “every
person,” this provision is interpreted more narrowly, to apply only to employees.
Given that the Supreme Court of Canada and ILO bodies regard freedom of
association as a guarantee that is not limited to employees, this would be an
opportunity to re-establish a greater breadth of application for the section 5
freedom provision.115
Because employee freedoms are efectuated by the ULP provisions of the
Act, it would also be necessary to amend these provisions (in particular, OLRA
114. Note that others, including David Doorey “Graduated Freedom of Association: Worker
Voice Beyond the Wagner Model” (2013) 38 Queen’s L.J. 511, and Alison Braley-Rattai
“Harnessing the Possibilities of Minority Unionism in Canada” (2013) 38 Lab Stud J 321,
identify section 7 of NLRA as reference points in their respective proposals for introducing
supplementary forms of minority unionism into Canadian labour law systems, although
neither addresses strikes as protected concerted activity.
115. Breen Creighton & Shae McCrystal “Who Is a Worker in International Law” (2015) 37
Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 691; Beatriz Vacotto, “Precarious Work and the Exercise of Freedom
of Association and Collective Bargaining: Current ILO Jurisprudence” (2013) 5 Intl J Labor
Res 117; ILO, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948
(No. 87); ILO, Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).
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sections 72 and 76) to refect the expanded scope of employee freedoms. To avoid
interpretive difculties, legislatures may consider adopting the approach taken in
the NLRA. Tere, the relevant ULP provision (NLRA section 8(a)(1)) explicitly
refers to the protected concerted activity guarantee, providing that it would
be a ULP for an employer “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [NLRA] section 7.” As both the OLRA
and the NLRA apply a reverse onus for such ULPs, no further change to ULP
processes or provisions would be required.116
B. STRIKES AND PICKETING

In respect of strikes, the more interventionist and restrictive approach of Canadian
labour legislation, compared to the NLRA, poses some challenges to extending a
guarantee of protected concerted activity to strike activity in Canadian statutes.
Tis may require policymakers to make some decisions about whether to
continue with the Canadian practice of tightly regulating strikes and permitting
only limited types of strikes, subject to numerous statutory preconditions,
to be lawful. Tis is a departure that Canadian labour law has taken from the
Wagner model, and diverges from the less interventionist approach taken by the
NLRA to strikes. As explained above, the NLRA permits more types of strikes
than does Canadian labour law and, rather than imposing preconditions on
strikes to be lawful, leaves it to the bargaining parties to negotiate “no-strike”
provisions in their collective agreements. Canadian policymakers may wish to
consider whether, as under the NLRA, recognition or ULP strikes, in addition
to bargaining strikes, could be lawful and whether, or to what degree, to leave
it to the parties to impose limits or preconditions on strike activity. If a more
restrictive approach to strikes is to be maintained, then explicit exceptions to the
expanded employee freedom provision would be necessary to account for such
limitations on concerted activity.
In addition, and in any event for greater clarity and in consideration of the
recent Supreme Court decision regarding the Charter protected right to strike,

116. Although beyond the scope of this article, in light of recent Charter decisions regarding
freedom of association protection of collective bargaining rights and Canada’s obligations
under international law, expansion of application of employee freedoms beyond “employees”
within the meaning of the Act may be due for consideration, as well as reconsideration of
statutory exclusions from the Act. See Michael Lynk, A Review of the Employee Occupational
Exclusions under the Ontario Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Queen’s Printer for Ontario,
2016). Tis report was prepared for the Ontario Ministry of Labour regarding continuing
justifability of exclusions of non-employees and others from labour legislation in Canada.
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legislators might contemplate adding an explicit right to strike to the legislation,
as exists in NLRA section 13.117
Finally, alongside strikes, the separate but often related activities of picketing
and leafeting should also be contemplated as forms of protected concerted
activity. While both are recognized as meriting Charter protection, if not under
the freedom of association then the freedom of expression, picketing is subject
to statutory regulation to diferent degrees in diferent Canadian jurisdictions.118
In jurisdictions such as Ontario, where the legislation does not directly regulate
picketing activity and picketing is largely governed by common law, amendments
may not be necessary.119
C. DIFFICULT QUESTIONS

Finally, contemplating introducing protection for concerted activity into
Canadian labour legislation may also give rise to some more difcult and
fundamental policy questions.
First, as seen in the examples introducing this article, NLRA section 7 can
be utilized by employees for short-lived collective action that is divorced from
the goals of union organizing or an ongoing collective bargaining relationship.
However, Canadian labour legislation and interpretations of the Charter
freedom of association are oriented towards establishing and engaging in an
enduring “collective bargaining relationship” between employers and trade
union representatives of groups of workers.120 In contemplating incorporating
protection akin to NLRA section 7 into Canadian labour legislation, these US
experiences should prompt us to refect on whether this unconventional (by
Canadian labour law standards, at least) form of associational activity—refecting
mobilizing rather than organizing—reveals a diferent type of representation gap

117. Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4.
118. U.F.C.W., Local 1518 v KMart Canada Ltd, [1999] 2 SCR 1083 (leafeting); R.W.D.S.U.,
Local 558 v Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd, 2002 SCC 8 (secondary picketing).
119. In Ontario, picketing may give rise to a ULP under the OLRA where, for instance, it gives
rise to a sympathy strike by other employees or the picketing involves threatening or coercive
conduct. See OLRA, supra note 6, ss 76, 83. In jurisdictions, such as British Columbia, where
the statute does govern picketing, amendments would be necessary. See BC Labour Relations
Code, supra note 84, Part 5, for an example of statutory regulation of picketing.
120. Tis type of collective action likely constitutes collective bargaining as it is understood
by international labour law as these actions are for the purpose of pursuing employees’
workplace goals they likely constitute collective bargaining. See Collective Bargaining
Convention, 1981 (No. 154), International Labour Organization, 3 June 1981, Art 2.
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afecting Canadian workers that should be addressed.121 Te experiences and
examples of US employees suggest that short-lived associational activity may
be of fundamental value to workers in a way that is distinct from conventional
organizing and collective bargaining and, as such, is worthy of explicit protection.
Second, introducing protection for concerted activity raises the question of
whether policymakers are prepared to provide a statutory foundation for minority
unionism in Canadian labour legislation. Minority unionism involves provision
of representation or bargaining rights to a union as a result of having agreement
(typically through membership) of less than a majority of employees. Neither
certifcation nor majority support is required. Te most commonly discussed
form of minority unionism is “members-only” unionism, whereby the union is
able to represent only its members. Under the NLRA, section 7 is the explicit
foundation for minority unionism. As currently interpreted by the NLRB and
courts, it permits, but does not require, members-only minority unionism, such
that an employer may, but is not required to, bargain with such unions.122
Currently, Canadian labour law does not prohibit voluntary employee
representation on a minority basis, much in the same way that most labour
legislation permits voluntary recognition without expressly providing for it.
Several scholars have advocated for forms of minority unionism to be adopted
into or alongside existing Canadian labour legislation, arguing that doing so
would be consistent with, or even required by, international law and the Charter
guarantee of freedom of association.123 However, critics caution against potentially
destabilizing and undesirable efects of minority unionism, and jurists have been

121. On the distinction between mobilizing and organizing in the labour context, see Jane
Holgate, Melanie Simms & Maite Tapia “Te limitations of the theory and practice of
mobilization in trade union organizing” (2018) 39 Econ & Indus Democracy 599.
122. Catherine Fisk & Xenia Tashlitsky “Imagine a world where employers are required to bargain
with minority unions” (2011) 27 ABA J Lab & Emp L 1. Some scholars, most notably
Charles J Morris, Te Blue Eagle at Work: Reclaiming Democratic Rights in the American
Workplace (Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 2005), contend that the text and legislative history of
section 7 of NLRA supports mandatory minority union bargaining.
123. See e.g. Doorey, supra note 114; Braley-Rattai, supra note 114; Roy J Adams “Bringing
Canada’s Wagner Act Regime into Compliance with International Human Rights Law
and the Charter” (2015) 19 Can Lab & Emp LJ 365; Mark Harcourt & Peter Haynes
“Accommodating minority unionism: Does the New Zealand experience provide options for
Canadian law reform” (2011) 16 Can Lab & Emp LJ 51.
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wary of the potential chaos that could arise from employers facing bargaining
with multiple unions.124

VII.CONCLUSION
While the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated worker activity arising from
fears of unsafe working conditions during this time have brought this labour
law secret into the headlines, it has also highlighted an important, but often
overlooked, diference in employee protections between US and Canadian
labour law. Tis diference centres on the narrow statutory freedoms granted
by Canadian labour law, compared to the broader scope and application of the
NLRA section 7 protected concerted activity guarantee. Although the pandemic
is, hopefully, a passing episode, the importance of protected concerted activity for
non-unionized workers should be an enduring concern.

124. See e.g. Fisk & Tashlitsky, supra note 122; Brad Walchuk “Te Pitfalls of Embracing
Minority Unionism” (2016) 6 J Workplace Rights 1; Compa, supra note 34. For discussion
of Canadian jurists’ trepidation about minority unionism, see Adams, supra note 83;
Fraser v Ontario (AG), 2008 ONCA 760 at para 92; Ontario (AG) v Fraser, 2011 SCC 20
at paras 346-51.

